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Border Collision: Power Dynamics
of Enforcement and Evasion across
the US-Mexico Line
Noelle K. Brigden and Peter Andreas

In 2005, Maria, 1 a humble and devout woman from rural El Salvador,
embarked on a clandestine journey to the United States. She made a
contract with a hometown smuggler, who then subcontracted with a series
of guides along the route. While under the care of one of those guides, her
travel party took a van across southern Mexico. 2 Confronted with the
possibility of being stopped by immigration authorities and questioned,
Maria began to pray and sing for their safe passage. She began timidly at
first. Upon hearing her shy voice, the guide turned to face her, and
demanded urgently and unkindly to know what she was doing. When she
explained, his face broke into a broad smile, and he responded, "Yes! Great
idea! If they stop us, we will tell them we are a church group." The smuggler,
faced with the potential for unpredictable traffic inspections by immigration
authorities, seized on the idea. For the rest of the journey in the van, her
travel party sang their praises to God loudly alongside their smuggler.
This encounter between Maria and her smuggler unwittingly generated
a new survival tactic, one of many novel tactics employed during a
clandestine journey to evade capture. Encounters between migrants,
smugglers, and the state are often creative moments. New strategies are
devised. New trajectories are imagined. New roles are crafted. This
creativity emerges from their interaction, as people grapple with uncer
tainty and danger. Maria's mobility, despite the state's attempt to thwart
her passage, is thus an outcome of a power that neither belongs fully to
Maria nor to her smuggler, but instead circulates contingent on uncertain
social moments.
An analysis of Maria's story, to which we will return later, helps to
elucidate why attempts to control the US-Mexico boundary have Jong
1
2

All names are pseudonyms. All quotes are reconstructed from shorthand taken during
interviews. We return to Maria's story later in the narrative.
Interview, El Salvador, December 22, 2009.
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had an ambiguous, and often counterproductive, impact on clandestine
flows. An unrelenting unauthorized traffic rolls north across the US
Mexico line. Nevertheless, while a massive allocation of resources to the
border has not succeeded in stemming the tide of contraband and migra
tion, it has dramatically reshaped these flows. 3 The geographic focal
points, 4 modes of transport, protocols, social relationships, and smug
gling networks 5 that underpin routes adapt to policing, and policing, in
tum, adapts to these adaptations. In the last two decades, border cross
ings have grown more dangerous for unauthorized migrants, generating a
new humanitarian crisis at the doorstep of the United States. 6 Thus, the
border remains porous, but policing has altered crossing practices with
deleterious consequences for migrants. The exercise of state power has
collided with a complex transnational social reality, producing cross
cutting consequences.
Our chapter explores the ambiguous outcome of this collision across
the US-Mexico divide. A myopic focus on conventional notions of
power, or its failure, contributes to perverse border policies and analytical
shortcomings. Public discourse neglects the protean power evident in
migrant improvisations, thereby underplaying migrants' agency and vili
fying smugglers with deleterious consequences for border policy; the
binary of powerless migrants/victims and powerful smugglers/victimizers
justifies further escalation of policing to protect both national and human
security. 7 Furthermore, this discourse also tends toward historical amne
sia about its own origins, highlighting the supposedly unprecedented
nature of migration crises and forgetting that the power dynamics evident
across the border extend back more than a century. Indeed, the starting
point in most analyses is the past few decades.
Finally, scholarship generally highlights the failure of border control,
rather than unpacking its complex consequences from different levels of
analysis. A broad consensus of scholars focuses on the inevitability that
border patrol displaces migration to new terrain and social practice, but
we know less about how exactly this displacement takes place, and how it
·has varied across place and time. While the fl.ow continues, displacement
is a disruptive and painful process in the lives of unauthorized migrants.
On the one hand, migrants endure tremendous precarity and violence,
and they sometimes die. On the other hand, migrants are not passive
victims; if they survive the treacherous journey north, their success
can often be attributed to a combination of fortuitous circumstance,
3

4
5

7

Andreas 2009.
Eschbach et al. 1999; Cornelius 2001; Madsen 2007; Slack et al. 2016.
Spener 2009. 6 Brigden 2013; Cornelius 2001; Eschbach et al. 1999; Ogren 2007.
Mainwaring 2016.
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intellectual and physical agility, and social flexibility that emerges within
encounters with other migrants, smugglers, or state authorities.
Scholarship has generally left unexplored how these indivi~ creative
1
moments collectively contribute to displacement.
Moving beyond traditional conceptualizations of power elucidates
such moments, and thereby explains the process of displacement over
time. The lens of protean power reveals the multifaceted roles played, not
only by traditionally powerful actors like the state and organized crime,
but also by individual migrants, like Maria,· in concert with the social
landscape they must cross. Practically, the lens of protean power compli
cates the binary of victim-villain, and thereby undermines a useful fiction
to justify border escalation. Analytically, this lens also provides a window
onto the primary mechanism of displacement: improvisation.
Thus, this chapter applies the concepts of protean power and control
power in tracing the evolution of the US-Mexico border enforcement and
evasion from the nineteenth century to the present. Following the defini
tion in this volume, protean power is the effect of an imaginative agility,
which contrasts with traditional notions of power. Protean power navi
gates a world of uncertainty, where successful responses to danger and/or
opportunity must rely, to a much greater degree, on improvisation and a
leap of faith. In contrast, control power is rooted in the capacity to
manipulate and respond to risk. This capacity presupposes a world of
rational calculations and knowable probabilities; under those relatively
predictable conditions, control power can be more effectively utilized to
incentivize and coerce particular behaviors from other actors.
Combining a historical perspective with more recent ethnographic
fieldwork on the experiences of unauthorized Central American migrants,
the chapter recasts the escalatory spiral of policing and smuggling at the
border as a collision between worldviews of risk and uncertainty, and
between protean and control power. The political and bureaucratic thea
trics that drive border policing are primarily premised on a world of risk.
Policing measures taken at the border are meant to convey an image of
control. Smugglers and migrants, however, live in a world of uncertainty,
as well as risk. 8 Border policing has increased the probability of dangers
befalling migrants on their journey, but it has also intensified the difficul
ties of judging that probability. Smugglers' and migrants' experiences
with and reactions to this hostile and unpredictable environment illus
trate the agility and adaptation associated with protean power. Thus, the
chapter provides a micro-foundation for understanding the dynamic
interaction between the state and unauthorized migration flows.
8
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Importantly, we argue that protean power is not an instrument that
marginalized people can harness to produce "social justice" in any pre
dictable way. In other words, it is not an effective means to achieve
collective political goals or to correct the structural inequities and vio
lence that reproduce the vulnerability of immigrant populations. Migrant
and smuggler improvisations generate protean power, but cannot direct
or use it to achieve such goals. Despite the fact that they often prove to
be capable of resisting and transgressing borders, migrants also experi
ence policing and violence as profoundly disempowering. Therefore, we
unpack these consequences for a variety of actors who populate the
migration corridor into the United States: migrants, smugglers, crime
bosses, and law enforcers. In conclusion, we caution against a celebration
of the emancipatory potential of protean power, even as we acknowledge
and explore its effect.
·

The Ambiguities of Power
The level of analysis matters crucially for how we understand this ambig
uous outcome of intensified border policing. On the one hand, we can see
the resilience of the border crossings when we look at the aggregate. The
migration stream continues to flow north, simply changing direction and
adapting to the policing with new clandestine practices. Indeed, at the
aggregate level, this outcome is easily predictable; the specific form of
criminal displacement may be unanticipated, but the general pattern is
expected. It is a policy failure foretold. Accepting the inevitability of this
general pattern, policymakers have for several decades now pursued border
policing that pushes migration routes to less visible terrain and practices. 9
Policymakers traffic in images of control, premised on assumptions of risk
management.
On the other hand, migrants may fail to cross the border and, sometimes,
they die in the attempt. During their journey from their homeland,
migrants sometimes fall victim to treacherous physical terrain or criminal
activity, such as kidnappings, extortions, murders, robberies, and rapes. 10
·Changes in policing often aggravate migrants' exposure to these dangers. 11
At the level of the individual, the lived experience of the border is very
different. The individual experience and personal consequences of the
border are not predictable; migrants must function under both conditions
of high uncertainty and risk, depending on the situation. 12 Migrants also
experience both risk and uncertainty, feeling buffeted both by increased
9
11

Andreas 2009. 10 Brigden 2012; Vogt 2013.
Brigden 2013; Martinez 2011; Ogren 2007. 12 Brigden 2015.
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probabilities of some dangers and the sheer unpredictability of other dan
gers. From their perspective, policing and subsequent adjustments in
smuggling circuits require an improvised response, ad,pting with agility
to changing conditions. Smugglers and migrants traffic in creative subver
sions of state control, choosing their conduct based on assumptions of
uncertainty, as well as risk.
In the risk scenario, the past experiences of friends and family members
can offer a reliable guide for future journeys. However, there is little
stability in the strategic setting of the clandestine route as experienced
by migrants. 13 The diffusion of survival information renders it suspect
when criminal predators or state authorities can manipulate it to their
advantage. A once-trodden path cannot necessarily be safely traversed a
second time. A once-trusted guide cannot necessarily be relied upon a
second time. Under these conditions, the trnstworthiness of information
has an immediate expiration date. In this reality, both migrants and
smugglers engage in a reflexive and strategic process throughout the
journey. They do not simply rely on information gleaned at the outset
of their journey through their existing social networks, but instead impro
vise new understandings en route. In other words, migrants and smug
glers, confronted with a mix of experienced risk and uncertainty, as well as
an underlying context that combines risk and uncertainty, exude an
extraordinarily malleable protean power.
Indeed, the level of analysis dictates how we see and experience power
itself. Control power becomes most apparent when we look from the top
down. Control power is the primary instrument of organized collective
actors and institutions. However, when we work at the level of individual
experience, protean power comes into view, as something that circulates
among creative individuals. If we view the state itself through the lens of
practice, we can see how protean power constitutes and compliments the
exercise of the state's control power, through a myriad offlexible everyday
actions conducted by state agents and bureaucrats. 14 Frontline border
patrol agents adapt and innovate on the ground, giving rise to protean
power that facilitates control. While criminal bosses exercise control
power over their territory, their henchmen give rise to protean power as
they implement their orders. In other words, depending on whether we
look at smuggling gangs and other criminal groups through the lens of an
organization or as individuals within that organization, different power
dynamics come into view. In contrast, migrants can be understood only as
an unchoreographed collection of people engaged in collective practice,
not even an approximate of a unified actor. Among the actors caught in
13

Brigden 2015.
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this border collision, they are uniquely vulnerable and marginalized,
depending almost entirely on protean power as a "weapon of the weak." 15
Thus, this chapter pays close attention to how we view the ambiguous
consequences of power.
·
The chapter is organized chronologically. We take the reader through
the collision over time, in order to highlight the dynamic between protean
and control power. We trace the evolution of border policing policies
from the late nineteenth century to the present, showing how such poli
cing has been premised upon assumptions of risk and the projection of an
image of control. Against this policy backdrop, we juxtapose the innova
tions of migrants and smugglers as they adapt to changes in policing over
time. Migrants and their smugglers make assumptions of uncertainty and
subvert control through improvisation.
However, the alliance between migrants and their smugglers is often an
uneasy marriage of convenience and complicated by pressures from other
criminal actors and the state. While migrants often improvise together
with their smugglers to achieve the shared goal of clandestine passage,
migrants also sometimes generate protean power as they resist their
smugglers. Indeed, the complexity of these relationships requires us to
disentangle the sometimes compatible, sometimes divergent interests of
migrants, their smugglers, criminal terrain bosses, and the state. Creative
moments emerge from actors' negotiation of these complex relationships
and their contradictions. Border control unwittingly spawns new types of
criminal characters, who seem to exude both kinds of power to exploit
migrants. In Mexico, these struggles have culminated in the arrival of
criminal bosses who more effectively control passage across their territory
than the state. The existence of multiple actors with cross-cutting inter
ests and capabilities complicates the effects of power.
The Collision in Historical Perspective

The collision between protean and control power across the US- Mexico
border is hardly new, though it has certainly intensified over time. 16 Many
of the border dynamics of immigration law eiiforcement and evasion we
see today can be viewed as representing the latest chapter in an old story
that dates back at least a century - a story that does not simply repeat
itself, but nevertheless has a remarkably consistent and recognizable
theme: through their interaction, protean and control power have stimu
lated and reinforced each other. Periods of low control power have
typically also been periods oflow protean power; likewise, as the exercise
15

Scott 1985.

16

This section draws on Andreas 2013.
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of control power by the state has increased, so too has the presence of
protean power. Indeed, protean power is integral to the f\lnctioning of
control power. Thus, ironically, while seemingly in opposition to each
other, these two forms of power have also been symbiotic, creating space
for one another.
Given all the attention today over the influx of Mexicans and Central
Americans across the border, it is especially striking that the first
unauthorized immigrants crossing the border from Mexico viewed by
US authorities as a problem were actually Chinese. Effons to prohibit
Chinese immigration in the late nineteenth century mark the beginning of
the federal government's long and tumultuous history of trying to keep
out "undesirables." The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 barred the entry
of Chinese laborers, who until then were mostly coming in by steamship
to San Francisco. But while this front-door entry was closing, back doors
were opening, especially via the US-Canada border and the US-Mexico
border. The federal government had no stand-alone immigration control
apparatus when the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, but enforcement
of the law would stimulate the creation of entirely new federal adminis
trative capacities.
The US-Mexico border, long a gateway for smuggled goods, was now
also becoming a gateway for smuggled people. In 1900, there were just a
few thousand Chinese in Mexico, but less than a decade later nearly
60,000 Chinese migrants had departed to Mexico. Some stayed, but the
United States was a far more attractive destination. 1 7 In his investiga
tions, US Immigration Inspector Marcus Braun witnessed Chinese arriv
ing in Mexico and reported that "On their arrival in Mexico, I found them
to be provided with United States money, not Mexican coins; they had in
their possession Chinese-English dictionaries; I found them in possession
of Chinese-American newspapers and of American railroad maps." 18 In
1907, a US government investigator observed that between twenty and
fifty Chinese arrived daily in the Mexican border town of Juarez by train,
but that the Chinese community in the town never grew. As he put it,
"Chinamen coming to Ciudad Juarez either vanish into thin air or cross
the border line." 19 Foreshadowing future developments, a January 1904
editorial in the El Paso Herald-Post warned that "If this Chinese immigra
tion to Mexico continues it will be necessary to run a barb wire fence
along our side of the Rio Grande." The El Paso immigration inspector
stated in his 1905 annual report that migrant smuggling is the sole busi
ness of "perhaps one-third of the Chinese population of El Paso. " 20
17
20

18
Ettinger 2009: 99.
Quoted in ibid.: 100.
Quoted in Reynolds 1909: 368.

19

Quoted in Lee 2003: 159.
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Some historians note that border smuggling operations involved cross
racial business collaborations, with white male smugglers often working
with Chinese organizers and Mexicans serving as local border guides. A
1906 law enforcement report on Chinese smuggling noted, "All through
northern Mexico, along the lines of the railroad, are located so-called
boarding houses and restaurants, which are the rendezvous of the
Chinese and their smugglers, and the small towns and villages throughout
this section are filled with Chinese coolies, whose only occupation seems
to be lying in wait until arrangements can be perfected for carrying them
across the border." 21
As US authorities tightened enforcement at urban entry points along
the California-Mexico border, smugglers shifted to more remote parts of
the border further east in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. And this
provided the rationale to deploy more agents to these border areas (this
dynamic would repeat itself again at the end of the century). In addition
to hiring more port inspectors, a force of mounted inspectors was set up to
patrol the borderline by horseback. As smugglers in later years turned to
new technologies such as automobiles, officials also pushed for the use of
the same technologies for border control. 22
Chinese migrants were not the only ones coming through the back door;
they were simply at the top of a growing list of "undesirables" that included
paupers, criminals, prostitutes, "lunatics," "idiots," polygamists, anarchists,
"in:ibeciles, ,, and contract workers in general.Japanese laborers were banned
in 1907. Illiterates were banned from entry in 191 7. As seaports became
more tightly regulated and policed, immigrants who feared being placed in
one of these excludable categories increasingly turned to the back door.
Those groups that were disproportionately being turned away at the front
door ports of entry - among them Lebanese, Greeks, Italians, Slavs from
the Balkans, and Jews - found Mexico to be a convenient back-door
alternative. 23
The popularity of the Mexican back door received a major boost by new
US restrictions on European immigration through the national origins
quotas in 19 21 and 1924. Passport rules left over from the First World
War formalized in the Passport Act of 1918, also now required immi
grants to secure visas at US consulates abroad. The Mexico smuggling
route offered a way to sidestep these new numerical restrictions and
documentation requirements. This sparked alarm in Washington and
provided political ammunition for calls for more border enforcement.
The commissioner-general of immigration reported in 1923 that each
new entry restriction "promoted the alien smuggling industry and
21

Quoted in Ettinger 2009: 60.

22

Lee 2003: 57-58.

23

Ettinger 2009: 105.
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furnished new and multiplied incentives to illegal entry. '~24 The commis
sioner's report the following year predicted that the hhmigration Law of
1924 "Will result in a further influx of undesirable European aliens to
Mexico with the sole object in view of affecting illegal entry into the
United States over the Rio Grande." 25
Local media reports reinforced these concerns. A December 22, 1924
article in El Paso's Spanish-language newspaper La Patria pointed to the
booming cross-border business for "contrabandistas de came hwnana"
("smugglers of human meat") in the wake of the new US immigration
restrictions. 26 The article (with the headline "Foreigners who want to cross
over to the United States have invaded the city ofJuarez") described Juarez
as a depot for foreigners waiting to enter the United States. 27 The US
Congress greatly expanded the immigration bureau's personnel powers to
search and arrest along and near the borderline. In a country otherwise
wary of increasing the power and reach of government, border control was
clearly one realm where there was a push to bolster federal authority.
Political pressure had been building up for a number of years to create a
uniformed border patrol force. The US Border Patrol was formed in 1924
with a S 1 million budget and a total force of some 450 officers. Its primary
mission was to keep out illegal immigrants, especially the smuggling of
Europeans. Wesley Stile, one of the first border patrol agents hired in the
summer of 1924, later recalled, "the thing that established the Border
Patrol was the influx of European aliens." Border patrolmen "didn't pay
much attention to the Mexicans" because they were considered merely
cheap seasonal farm labor that returned to Mexico when no longer
needed. 28 This meant that the growing influx of unauthorized Mexican
workers was largely tolerated and overlooked - at least for the time being.
For Mexicans, crossing the border illegally was relatively simple and
largely ignored - successful entry did not require much creative agility.
Up to half a million Mexicans may have come to the United States in the
first decade of the century. The Mexican Revolution, US labor shortages
during the First World War, and the continued expansion of agriculture
in the southwest fueled a further influx. There was a growing disconnect
between the formal entry rules handed down from a distant capital and
the realities, needs, and practices along the border. In other words, the
"control power" called for in national immigration laws did not translate
into its application on the ground.
As a substitute for European and Asian workers, employers considered
Mexicans an ideal labor force: flexible, compliant, and temporary - or so
24
26

Quoted in Siener 2008: 60. 25 Quoted in McCullough 1992: 51-52.
Quoted in ibid.: 6. 27 Ibid.: 230-31. . 28 Quoted in Ettinger 2009: 162.
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it seemed at the time. Millions of unauthorized Mexican migrants would
eventually settle in the United States, becoming a vital source oflabor for
agriculture and other sectors of the economy but also the main rationale
for more intensive border enforcement. It was not until 1929 that US
border inspectors even made any real effort to regulate the entry of
Mexican nationals; even as late as the 1980s, border controls remained
at token levels. US Border Patrol agents could cover only about 10
percent of the nearly 2,000-mile border, and most of those apprehended
were simply sent back across the line to try again. Most smugglers caught
were simply let go, and those who were not were charged with a
misdemeanor. 29
Anemic enforcement (a bare minimum exercise of control power)
meant that illegal entry across the border remained a relatively simple
and inexpensive activity: migrants either smuggled themselves across the
border or hired a local coyote. The use of a professional smuggler
remained more of a convenience than a necessity. Hiring the services of
a smuggler generally meant a faster and safer trip across the line. Use of a
smuggler did involve personal risks (there was the potential for theft and
physical abuse), but attempting the border crossing without such help
increased the likelihood of assault by border bandits and abuse by
authorities.
The long if uneasy border equilibrium between relatively low levels of
control power and protean power became unsustainable in the midst of a
growing domestic anti-immigrant backlash that culminated in the 1990s,
with California (home to an estimated half of the nation's unauthorized
migrant population) at the epicenter. Just as the late nineteenth-century
backlash against Chinese immigrants began in California, so too did the
backlash against Mexican immigrants in the late twentieth century - with
the fallout spreading across the entire border.
In the heated early and mid- l 990s policy debates about illegal immigra
tion and a seemingly "out of control" border, in which politicians from
across the political spectrum were scrambling to outdo each other in
proposing tough new immigration-control measures, the federal govern
ment launched a high-profile border enforcement crackdown. Long
viewed as the neglected stepchild of the Department of Justice, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suddenly became one of
the fastest-growing federal agencies. The INS budget grew from Sl.5
billion in fiscal year 1993 to S4 billion in fiscal year 1999, with border
enforcement by far the single largest line item. The size of the Border Patrol
more than doubled along the border by the end of the decade. The new
29
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border enforcement campaign also included an influx of new equipment,
ranging from night-vision scopes and low-light TV cameras to ground
sensors, helicopters, and all-terrain vehicles. The military also played a
supporting role by assisting with the operation of night scopes, motion
sensors, and communications equipment, as well as buil~g and main(
taining roads and fences. 30
Congress assured that the border build-up would continue by passing
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996. The sweeping law sharply increased the penalties against migrant
smugglers, and authorized the hiring of 1,000 Border Patrol agents a year,
reaching a total force of more than I°0,000 by 2001. Most of these agents
would be deployed to the most popular urban entry points for unauthor
ized migration, such as El Paso and San Diego, with the goal of disrupting
and deterring the flow. Left out of this immigration-control offensive was
any meaningful focus on workplace controls - in other words, the appli
cation of "control power" was highly selective and focused. It was highly
visible, but also extremely thin.
Not surprisingly, tighter border controls in El Paso and San Diego
pushed migrants to attempt entry elsewhere along the border. These
shifts in human traffic, in turn, generated further political pressures and
bureaucratic rationale to geographically expand the border-policing cam
paign. Consequently, a Border Patrol force that had already more than
doubled in the 1990s more than doubled again in the first decade of the
twenty-first century.
In order to cross a now much more intensively patrolled border suc
cessfully, migrants increasingly turned to professional smugglers. As INS
commissioner Doris Meisner acknowledged, "as we improve our enforce
ment, we increase the smuggling of aliens that occurs, because it is harder
to cross and so therefore people tum more and more to smugglers. " 31
And as the risks and smuggling fees jumped (from hundreds of dollars to
thousands of dollars per crossing), smuggling became a much more
organized and sophisticated business. Breaking up the traditional routes
and methods of clandestine entry turned the once relatively simple illegal
act of entry without inspection into a more complex underground web of
illegality. Put differently, the greater control power exercised by the state
made migrants more dependent on protean power and smugglers.
In tum, US officials went to great lengths to portray migrants as the
victims of smugglers, and they used this both to deflect criticism and to
provide a further rationale to crack down on smuggling. But this was
a much too simple and convenient a characterization of smugglers.
30
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Migrants generally viewed smugglers as simply a "necessary evil," a
clandestine business transaction in which they willingly engaged to
evade the expanding border enforcement net. Within Mexico, many
considered migrant smuggling a shady business, but one that was provid
ing a high-demand service. Smugglers could be abusive and reckless, and
their efforts to bypass law enforcement could place migrants at great risk;
hundreds were dying every year in trying to cross the border in the harsh
and remote terrain where border enforcement was thinnest. Yet smug-·
glers were hired precisely because they generally provided a safer, faster,
and more reliable border-crossing experience.
Smugglers also became more skilled as border enforcement became
more intensive: Although some of the local freelance entrepreneurs who
once dominated migrant smuggling along the border were being squeezed
out by the border-enforcement offensive, they were replaced by better
organized and more skilled migrant-smuggling organizations. This, in
tum, was used to justify tougher laws and tougher enforcement. The
number of smugglers being prosecuted mushroomed, and more punitive
sentencing guidelines significantly increased the length of prison terms for
smugglers. But this did not translate into a shortage of smugglers. More
risks translated into higher smuggling fees. And as the risks for smuggling
rose, so too did the incentive for smugglers to use more dangerous
methods to avoid law enforcement.
The Lived Experience of Today's Collision

~s we have seen, although the collision between protean and control
power along the US-Mexico divide is not new, it has intensified.
Contemporary relationships between the state, migrants, smugglers,
and criminal terrain bosses are the~selves an outcome of over a century
of these power collisions at the US border. However, the latest chapter of
this old story further complicates simple narratives about the interactions
of these actors and their relative power. Drawing on ethnographic mate
rials collected in a study of clandestine Central American migration to the
United States, 32 we trace the power dynamics within these relationships.
This tracing reveals the sometimes contradictory and sometimes symbio
tic connections between protean and control power. It also reveals the
lived contradictions of protean power, · as experienced by migrants
themselves.
The on-the-ground experience of the US government control agenda is a
story of protean power. The everyday practice of policy implementation
32
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requires discretion and deft maneuvers on the part of the street-level
bureaucrats. 33 Border control is not an exception to this general rule; it
too generates protean power. Routines must be adapted to a lived reality,
or they are rendered useless; patrols cannot keep a s ~ schedule and
unchanging route without becoming predictable and easy to evade by
smugglers. Frontline immigration agents must rely on discretion, 34 their
wits, innovations and improvisations on protocols and stereotypes35 to
adapt to unforeseen events at the border. 36 A border official explained the
gut feeling that develops with experience, "But people develop a sense.
It's like at the border. The agents can see a car coming from half a mile
away: Maybe the mannerisms are just not right. It's just that something
doesn't feel right. The agents have a difficult time articulating the prob
able cause. They just know who to stop." After further questioning, the
border official explained that, "In law enforcement, we call it profiling. " 37
Indeed, the US courts implicitly recognize the necessary role of protean
power, by granting border patrol agents greater discretion in their job
than any other law enforcement agent. 38 In order to empower them to
make judgments and act on their wits at the border, the courts have
defined stan_d ards for probable cause loosely for US Border Patrol. As
the state attempts to increase its control power at the border, this discre
tion, which creates a space for border agents to exercise their protean
power, plays an increasingly vital role in the national security agenda.
In response to the increased control power exercised by the state,
smugglers and migrants generate a collective protean power. Indeed,
smugglers and migrants sometimes co-improvise migration strategies to
achieve their common objectives. The most reputable smugglers behave
as service providers, treating migrants as valued customers, protecting
them from criminal predators, or settling disputes among travel compa
nions. In tum, migrants generally agree to keep the smuggler's identity
secret if they are apprehended by border patrol. For their part, experi
enced migrants may be called upon to assist smugglers, helping to guide
or maintain order in the travel group. Indeed, the boundary between
smuggler and migrant may be blurred, when these migrants accept travel
discounts, receive upgraded treatment, or other payments for such aux
iliary support. Experienced migrants may begin to work as guides.
Sometimes migrants co-innovate new migration tactics. As Maria's
33
35

36
37
38

Lipsky 2010. 34 Bouchard and Carroll 2002; Salter 2008: 370.
Gilboy 1991; Heyman 2009.
Interview, El Salvador, September 2, 2010, also quoted in Brigden 2016.
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story from the introduction illustrates, collective brainstorming or
migrant-smuggler partnerships to devise new ways around unexpected
barriers to mobility are not uncommon.
When Maria and her smuggler had devised the plan to sing gospel, she
and her companions did not know that rar greater dangers awaited them
in northern Mexico. At a point just north of Puebla, Maria's guide slipped
into the secret compartment alongside the migrants. If stopped, he would
pass as one of them, and they had all sworn to protect his identity. His
decision to conceal himself among loyal clients proved to be fortuitous. A
new guide drove the banana truck in which they were hidden. Squatting
in these cramped quarters in the hidden compartment, Maria heard the
three gunshots that killed the driver. They had been stopped by a heavily
armed group of bandits, dressed in black. Based on their paramilitary
appearance and ruthless behavior, Maria presumed these men and
women to be the Zetas. Having recently taken control of the territory,
this criminal group had not received the appropriate passage fee from the
Salvadoran smugglers. Thus, the bandits kidnapped the migrants and
held them until family members or friends paid for their delivery. And the
bandits began to negotiate with Maria's hometown smuggler for a more
regular fee to cross their territory. The kidnappers treated Maria and her
travel companions harshly, but Maria was fortunate because this criminal
group delivered her to New York in exchange for the smuggling payment.
Every year thousands of migrants are not so lucky; kidnappers often
release migrants in Mexico, rather than the United States, or turn them
o_v er to Mexican migration authorities for deportation after receiving
ransoms. Sometimes they keep their victims indefinitely, breaking pro
mises and demanding ever more money from desperate family members.
Luckily for Maria, she arrived and lived in New York for several years,
before returning home to El Salvador as a local success story. She saved
the money to build her dream home and open a restaurant near the center
of town, until extortion demands and threats from a Salvadoran street
gang forced her to migrate a second time.
When Maria made the return journey to the United States in 201 0, she
contracted with the same hometown smuggler for the second passage
from El Salvador to New York. She did so despite the killing of the guide
he had subcontracted and her subsequent kidnapping during the first
journey. However, Maria made this choice of smuggling service provider
not primarily to avoid US border agents or Mexican migration authori
ties, but because the hometown smuggler probably knew which criminals

to pay to cross Mexico safely. She was primarily frightene~ of the Zetas
drug-trafficking organization operating in Mexico, which had acquired
infamy for their kidnapping of migrants for ransom. Ultimately, Maria
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and her family crossed Mexico, but were captured by the US border
patrol.
They_immediately filed an asylum claim based on the criminal gang
based persecution they had suffered in El Salvador,~ this claim was
eventually granted. Indeed, an increasing number of Central Americans
turn themselves in to US border agents or allow themselves to be
captured in order to file asylum claims. Some smugglers instruct their
clients to do so, improvising upon the legal resources made available to
migrants by the state. While many of these claims are in fact well
founded asylum cases, smugglers and migrants nevertheless deftly
leverage the state's own institutions against its control power. Thus,
the "cracks and contradictions" of institutions (Reus-Smit, Chapter 3,
pp. 60, 61, 66, 68) provide opponunities for improvisation and innova
tion; in this case, borders and the refugee protection regime collide,
demonstrating how, at the right moment, migrants and smugglers can
exploit the nexus of "co-existing, overlapping, but often discordant
singular institutions" (Reus-Smit, Chapter 3, p. 61).
In the contemporary context of the escalation of the Mexican drug war
(post-2006), Central American migrants like Maria no longer only pay
smugglers to resist the control power of the state. Instead, these migrants
also pay smugglers to help them negotiate a perilous passage across
territory controlled by Mexican criminal terrain bosses. For Central
Americans, the danger of Mexican criminal terrain bosses is the primary
motivation for contracting a smuggler. Well-informed migrants often pay
.smugglers not because they know their way around US border patrol
effons, but because their smugglers know which criminal to pay for safe
passage. 39 As explained by one migrant, "A good coyote is well con
nected; he knows who and how to bribe. ,,4 o The control power of
Mexican criminal territory bosses, who extort crossing fees from both
migrants and smugglers, guarantees that the profession of smuggling will
remain profitable. This shift in control to criminal territory bosses illus
trates the dynamic between control and protean power over time, and it
signals how actors may be impacted by multiple forms of power depend
ing on which relationship they engage.
When the drug war erupted spectacularly in 2006, Mexican territory
began to change hands quickly and without warning among competing
criminal gangs. The Mexican crime groups splintered with fighting
between and within. These gangs began to kidnap northbound migrants
for profit. They also kidnapped migrants to renegotiate passage fees with
Central American human smugglers. The fees for criminal crossing
39
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increased in tandem with the intensification of violence, rapid shifts in
criminal control, the breaking of old business protocols, and the fragmen
tation of terrain among competing gangs.
At the same time, beginning in the aftermath of September 11 and
continuing into the present, bilateral US-Mexican cooperation for con
traband interdiction has intensified. 41 Most recently, in 2014, Mexico
launched a reinvigorated "Plan Sur" primarily policing the southern train
routes that the poorest and most vulnerable migrants often board like
hobos to get to the United States. To give a sense of the magnitude of this
policing effort, the number of Central Americans deported from Mexico
has exceeded the number deported from the United States. 42 Such immi
gration enforcement operations have made migrants ever-more reliant on
hiring smugglers for successful arrival in the United States.
Despite this massive Mexican enforcement campaign, as well as ongoing
fighting within and between gangs, criminals have proven to be more adept
at controlling clandestine traffic through their territory than the state.
Working through both civilian informants and corrupt state officials,
their intelligence networks actively identify smugglers and migrants who
have not paid the requisite passage fee. The efficiency of these stealthy
networks is legendary among migrants, who sometimes whisper about the
spies who travel alongside them to collect information for criminals. Even if
US border enforcement were to disappear, human smuggling would now
persist as a profession, because migrants - especially non-Mexican
migrants - need the smugglers' contacts to negotiate passage across crim
inal terrain. Ironically, Mexican criminal bosses generate protean power;
they deftly manipulate expansive social networks, fluid shifting alliances,
the recruitment of former soldiers and police with counterinsurgency skills,
violent stagecraft and message murders that project an intimidating repu
tation, and other flexible tactics. In ·s o doing, the Mexican criminal bosses
impose greater control power along smuggling routes than do states. ·
The ruthlessness of the Mexican criminal bosses is infamous by design,
not unlike modern-day terrorist organizations that capitalize on their
violent and powerful image with carefully publicized acts (Mendelsohn,
Chapter 9). As the drug war has intensified during the past decade,
criminal groups have employed increasingly brutal methods to extract
money from Central American smugglers and their migrant clients.
Capture by border patrol may force migrants to begin the journey again,
a terrible prospect after coming so far from home. For migrants with
criminal records or multiple crossing attempts, capture by the border
41
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patrol may even be punished with a lengthy prison sentence. However,
these consequences pale in comparison with the torture, trafficking, rape,
ransom demands, and, sometimes, murders that occur at the hands of
Mexican criminal territory bosses, such as the Zetas dr-the so-caUed "Gulf
cartel.'' Ransoms generally cost migrants' families thousands of dollars,
often money that had been borrowed to pay smugglers for the delivery of
migrants in the United States. Without the migrant to work off the debt in
the United States, immigrant families that pay these ransoms may be left
financially destitute. To extract sufficient information to make these
ransom demands or to intimidate migrants into submission, kidnappers
sometimes cut off their victim's fingers or beat them with wooden boards.
Female migrants may be trafficked for sex work rather than ransomed.
Conditions in the drop houses where migrants are held for ransom can
only be described as deplorable. When thinking about making a clandes
tine journey, US border policing is often the least of Central American
migrants' worries.
Criminal territory bosses are not the only non-state actors who attempt
to dominate migrants. Despite their shared enemies of the state and
dangerous criminal terrain bosses, smugglers have also long been infa
mous for the exploitation of their clients, imposing control over migrants.
This is perhaps even truer today than in the past. Even in early periods of
border crossing, smugglers had been known to threaten and intimidate
female migrants into having unwanted sexual relations. Smugglers may
not keep promises about travel and living conditions en route, subjecting
migrants to more suffering than expected. Smugglers sometimes steal
from and cheat migrants, abandoning them in dangerous places along
the route. They may sell their human cargo to traffickers. Smugglers may
collaborate with kidnappers, who demand ransoms from family members
in the United States without delivering them there. Finally, smugglers
may suddenly attempt to renegotiate their contract with the migrant at a
vulnerable moment during the journey, extorting more money than the
original agreement had entailed.
At some point during the journey, virtually all Central American migrants
experience a deprivation of liberty at the hands of their smuggler, even when
the migrant- smuggler contract is consensual, rather than the outcome of a
kidnapping. 43 Migrants may be locked inside a hidden compartment of a
vehicle, incapable of escaping if conditions turn dangerously hot or oxygen
deprived. They may be locked in an unsanitary drop house with other
migrants for days or weeks to wait for an opportune moment to make the
43
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next segment of the journey, or to wait for a payment to the smuggler from
US-based relatives.
It should be pointed out that this predatory protean power, benefiting
smugglers as well as other criminal organizations, ultimately contributes
to the US policy goal of making the border harder for migrants to cross
(even as migrants rely on smugglers and the bribing of criminal organiza
tions to make it across the border). In this way, predatory protean power
serves as an unintended accomplice in control power objectives.
Nevertheless, migrants are not powerless. They resist smugglers and
kidnappers. Escape stories abound, as migrants flee buildings that are
poorly equipped to hold hundreds of captives or take advantage of drun
ken debauchery during football matches or holidays to slip past inebriated
guards. In interviews, a migrant found a window in a bathroom, another
carefully learned the schedule of his captors, and yet another broke
through a shoddily constructed wall to find freedom. Acts of collective
resistance also erupt in these drop houses, and in one particularly dra
matic story, migrants grabbed pitchforks and shards of broken glass to
defend themselves against armed assailants. 44 Migrants may submit to
their captors outwardly in appearance only, but continue to conspire
quietly to regain their freedom.
However, protean power comes at a terrible cost for many migrants.
The Honduran man, Maynard, who told the dramatic story of resisting
kidnappers with pitchforks and broken glass wept when he remembered
how the kidnappers beheaded his co-conspirator; their plan had been
discovered prematurely, because a particularly hungry captive had
informed on them in exchange for food rations. It had been the second
time Maynard had been betrayed by another migrant; a Honduran
"friend" had sold him to the kidnappers. Other migrants who survived
kidnappings wept, rather than congratulate themselves on their
impressive feats of resistance and wit, as they thought of the people
left behind or the expense of the ransoms to their families. Migrants
often do not experience a sense of empowerment from their capacity to
negotiate a humiliating, morally compromising and physically difficult
journey.
The physical sacrifices of the journey art; common knowledge across the
region, leaving lasting scars on the bodies of border crossers. For those that
survive the passage, the price of protean power still potentially includes
extreme hunger and malnutrition, exposure to the elements or wildlife,
illness from contaminated water, suffering assaults, disembodiment from
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falls from the train, and injuries in the desert. However, these scars often
run deeper than the skin and bones of a migrant.
The trauma of the journey can leave lasting soci~ and moral traces in
the psyche of border crossers. Even the most successful border crossers
must lie or alienate themselves from loved ones to survive. A
Salvadoran woman, Ana, traveled with her two small children and a
military-age nephew across Mexico in the late 1980s. 45 She tearfully
described the ethical dilemmas she faced in transit. Her husband had
already fled due to political persecution during the civil war. Her
nephew had been a low-ranking infantryman, and he deserted to flee
the violence. On the way north, they boarded a bus, pretending to be
Mexican. The guide kept them separate, and told them that they must
all act like strangers. Her nephew was sitting a few seats from her when
police boarded the bus and took him away. At this point in the story,
Ana wept remembering how she could only assume that he was being
led away to his death, "Imagine pretending you don't know your own
nephew ... But that is how it is on the road." To survive, she had to
momentarily disavow her kin, silently watching him be led to potential
slaughter. 46 She thereby maintained her disguise and continued north,
exercising her power to move and protecting her children, but at a
terrible emotional and, in Ana's interpretation, moral cost. Her power
to migrate was inexorably tied to her acceptance of her powerlessness to
help her nephew.
Later in the journey, Ana traveled in a private car with her children
and smuggler. Before passing through the highway migration check
point, Ana and her smuggler had to coach her young son. The smuggler
instructed the boy to say he was his father if anyone asked. The seven
year-old boy became indignant at the suggestion, "You are not my
father! My father is in the US and we are going to him!" The smuggler
was patient, but the situation was critical. The boy had to be taught how
to lie. While interviewing her, Ana shook her head with sadness at the
memory of threatening her son to dissuade him from telling the truth.
While she did not say it aloud, perhaps, her thoughts briefly skipped
ahead to the rebellious young man he later became, a regret that she had
discussed on other occasions. Deception is part of the power that
migrants can draw upon, but they do so at a cost. In Ana's estimation,
she paid with her son's virtue and her own responsibility as his mother.
Teaching her son to lie went against her principles as a mother and a
45
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devout Catholic, but morality must be bent (in this case, somewhat
gently) in the realm of protean power.
However traumatizing the journey might be for Ana, telling lies to
migration police is one of the lesser moral quandaries that migrants face
in transit today. In the contemporary context, migrants may be forced to
collaborate with criminal terrain bosses and kidnappers. A small minority of
migrants become spies infiltrating the migration stream. They lead groups
of migrants into ambush or monitor the activities of human rights activists,
smugglers, and other migrants for criminal bosses. These co-opted
migrants become the eyes and feet of criminal networks along the smug
glingroute. Migrants' capacity to go undetected among their co-nationals is
a form of protean power that comes from the ability to cleverly disguise
intentions and improvise upon social expectations and stereotypes to forge
new relationships. In tum, this protean power serves as a resource for
criminal territory bosses to exen control power over the smuggling route.
Such protean power enables the migrant's survival and mobility, but at the
expense of others.
This form of collaboration represents neither outright resistance nor
acceptance of the control power of the state. Such collaboration on
the part of migrants is a survival tactic that mirrors relationships that
form across a variety of violent settings, generating what Primo Levi calls
a "grey zone," where distinctions between victims and perpetrators
become blurry. 47 The fact that this power comes at the price of solidarity
among Central Americans and an increase in the suffering of a vulnerable
population does not go unnoticed by migrants. As a Honduran woman
ruefully lamented, "They are us, same as us: Hondurans, Guatemalans,
Salvadorans. My own paisanos are those that rob. That's why you can't
trust people in the [Catholic migrant] shelter either." The Honduran
woman turned to a Guatemalan girl next to her, "You don't know who
they are, your own paisanos. " 48 Indeed, a sense of betrayal often accom
panies the experience of the journey. A shadowy world of mistrust,
chameleon-like characters, and ephemeral alliances is the price of protean
power.

.

Conclusion: Protean Power and Predation
As this chapter has suggested, protean power should not simply be
equated with "empowerment." It is worth noting that migrants them
selves do not celebrate protean power. They would much rather see a
dramatic immigration policy change than be forced to improvise a terrible
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and dangerous clandestine journey. They would rather the state leave
them alone than be forced to respond to it with jigility and ingenuity. In
fact, ·the practices in which they must engage during the journey are often
experienced as profoundly disempowering and dehumanizing. As
Maria's and Ana's stories suggest, survival often requires painful com
promises of morality or extraordinary physical sacrifices.
Protean power is not a form of solidarity that promises to bring us to
a more just or equitable world. It is a fragmented force that enables
some individuals to navigate a path to the United States, but does not
address the larger socio-economic and political structures that moti
vate migrant journeys and shape the migration route. Predatory pat
terns emerge from protean power generated by some migrants as they
survive violence at the expense of their compatriots. Such predation
may thwart some political projects and undermine a sense of shared
identity. Furthermore, protean power seems better fit for creative
resistance of control than to capturing and controlling the direction
of state policy.
As far as migrants are concerned, "weapons of the weak" are a distant
second best to a US immigration policy revolution. For this reason, Reece
Jones calls everyday practices that transgress state boundaries, but with
out an overt political motivation, a form of "refusal" rather than
"resistance. " 49 Such activities are disruptive and have structural effects,
but their participants do not necessarily understand them as resistance or
empowerment. Protean power clearly complicates control power.
Nevertheless, control power also necessitates and, in an important
sense, generates its own antithesis in protean power. Likewise, protean
power constitutes control power. When viewed through the lens of
experience, even the state requires the protean power of individuals to
implement its control. Finally, given the perverse escalation spirals that
sometimes emerge from the interaction of the two forms of power, the
future structural effects of protean power remain unclear, and may ulti
mately reinforce control power rather than undermine it. Nevertheless,
protean power is creative and, thus, a form of agency that cannot be
overlooked if we wish to understand the dynamic process of control and
evasion at the border.
Indeed, using different levels of analysis, we have explored the interac
tion of control power and protean power, showing how their collision has
produced a humanitarian catastrophe at the border, not just a failure to
curb migration. Ifwe only look from the top down at the border, we see a
mirage of control that might be heralded as a victory for policing.
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Nonetheless, it is a pyrrhic victory of control power, representing a
decrease in the visibility of an otherwise continuous flow of unauthorized
migrants across the US-Mexico line. Nor, however, can continued bor
der crossings be heralded as a victory of protean power. If we look through
an ethnographic lens from the bottom up, where protean power becomes
visible for individuals, we have seen the true consequences of the attempt
to impose control: dramatically intensified human suffering. The inter
action of control with protean power produces this tragic outcome.
Shifting the line of sight of our analysis brings the tragedy, as well as the
victory, of protean power into focus. Border guards and border crossers
both experience profound uncertainty and risk, and ethnographic meth
ods bring this experiential level into view. Thus, for the contemporary
period, we augment our historical analysis with ethnographic research on
the day-to-day experience of Central American migrants attempting to
clandestinely reach and cross the US- Mexico border.
From this analysis, we find that at key moments control power is
constituted by protean power. We can see this complementarity when
we move up and down the levels of analysis from collective actors to
practice. At the level of practice, the state generates the protean power
as its individual immigration agents exert control power at the border.
These improvised practices constitute the state, and the protean power
generated by individuals engaged in such improvisations constitutes the
state's control power. Similarly, organized gangs that control territory
i:equire the protean power of individual criminals, that is, the smugglers,
look-outs, enforcers, and others. Moving up and down the levels of
analysis shows us how protean power complements, and in some ways
creates spaces for the operation of ~ontrol power.
In other moments, control power and protean power of various actors
interact, leading to a spiral of intensification with yet unpredictable out
comes. As the state exerts control power, it calls protean power into
existence. Necessity is the mother of invention, and border control is
the mother of improvised smuggling and migration practice. The protean
power generated by migrants and smugglers then destabilizes the fa~ade
of control, justifying further control effort by the state. We see this inter·
action by moving across history.
Although beyond the scope of this chapter, this type of analysis could
be extended to the recent plight of African and Middle Eastern
migrants attempting to enter Europe. Attempts to control illegal traffic
across the Mediterranean have had an ambiguous, and often counter
productive, impact on clandestine flows. An unrelenting unauthorized
traffic drifts north from the northern African coastline. For the last two
decades of policing intensification, the bodies of failed border crossers
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have washed ashore on European beaches alongside tourists. While a
massive allocation of resources to fortify the E~opean continent against
these flows has not succeeded in stemming the tide of contraband and
migration,50 it has dramatically restructured the lived experience of migra
tion in ways similar to those survived by Central American migrants seek
ing to enter the United States. 51 The geographic focal points, 52 social
relationships, and smuggling networks53 that underpin routes adapt to
policing.
Since the 1990s, the Mediterranean crossing has grown more danger
ous for unauthorized migrants, 54 especially in recent years. In response
to the Syrian refugee crisis and a recent series of high-profile calamities
suffered by boat migrants during clandestine passages, NATO ships
have been deployed to the Aegean Sea to deter human smuggling. 55
Our analysis leads to the expectation that, despite its humanitarian
justifications, these militarized deterrence efforts will lead to a formid
able increase of suffering, but ultimately prove incapable of halting
clandestine flows into Europe. Instead, the complex collision between
the control power of the state and the protean power generated by
migrants will likely continue to expand and intensify on the periphery
of Europe.
Our chapter has shown how a ground-level line of sight helps us to son
out precisely these complex effects of power on diverse actors and their
relationships. We find that different forms of power alternate, cross
cutting between empowerment and disempowennent at key moments in
interactions between state actors, smugglers, migrants, and criminal
territory bosses. Furthermore, the ground-level line of sight, at the
level of experience, brings surprising instances of protean power into
view, sometimes constituting the control power exerted by collective
actors like the state. In this way, we complicate the dichotomy between
state- non-state actors and their relationship to control- protean power.
Recently, much to the chagrin oflow-ranking smugglers, more powerful
criminal actors have imposed control over clandestine flows through
their terrain. The tightened control of terrain by criminal bosses repre
sents a new iteration of, and increasingly complex interplay between,
control and protean power. Migrants must sometimes resist the control
of their own smugglers, and the very existence of smuggling as a profes
sion is predicated on the imperfect but potent control power of the
state and now criminal territory bosses. Power reverberates in often
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unpredictable ways through these layered and shifting relationships
between the state, smugglers, territory bosses, and migrants, as experi
enced by the individuals implicated within them. Across the US
Mexico border and across the globe, states have tightened enforcement,
thereby restructuring these layered and ·shifting relationships, intensify
ing the experience of uncenainty along clandestine routes, and often
unwittingly complicating (though not undoing) control power by calling
protean power into existence.

